What part did the United States of America have in making the Eritrean independence possible? Why?

Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia in 1993, the first ever in Africa, was stimulated by various factors and actors that were both domestic and international. However, the most significant international actor was the United States of America, which played a crucial role in creating an independent Eritrea using its military, economic, diplomatic, and political strength. The reasons for America to support the Eritrean independence were numerous ranging from strategic to humanitarian motivations. The subsequent paragraphs will explain the role of the United States in achieving Eritrean independence and the reasons behind it. However, before the American intervention in the Horn of Africa is discussed, it is paramount to understand the nature of the ethnic conflict and the argument for Eritrea’s independence.

Eritrea, which lies in the north of Ethiopia, has always claimed to have a unique history compared to that of inland Ethiopia due to “Eritrea’s location on the Red Sea”.[1] Further to that, when the Italians occupied the Eritrean territory in the 1930s, the Ethiopian government, ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie seemed to have neglected the Eritrean population. From then on there was a stronger sense of nationalist movement originating from the Tigray population of Eritrea[2], which happened to be demographically the most populous tribe in that area. Since Eritrea was colonized by Italy, then taken over by the British, the “modernized Eritrea and educated and politicized Eritreans, in contrast to Ethiopia’s feudalism and underdevelopment”[3] had therefore looked down upon the Ethiopian population and society. After the Second World War ended, “Eritrea’s unsuccessful bid for independence…led to the formation of indigenous political parties and movements”[4]. On the contrary, Ethiopia, which was primarily made up of Oromos and Tigrays, and Ahmaras happening to be the elite and ruling tribe[5], was rather diverse in nature but considered Eritrea to “have had one history, sharing the same fate with the ebb and rise of the country’s fortunes”.[6] The Ethiopians also link the Eritrean Tigray descent to that of the Axumite civilization, which Ethiopia strongly is proud of as its own heritage.[7] Despite of Eritrea’s efforts to be independent, the most it could achieve was earning autonomy under a United Nations settlement known as the Abortive Federation of 1950[8]. John Sorenson found that the “post-federation repression most [was] critical for creating a national Eritrean identity”[9], which then caused a chain of political tensions and maneuverings from various international players and of course domestic ones too.

The federation was not imposed well and Emperor Haile Selassie managed to annex Eritrea in 1962.[10] The economically thriving area of the port of Massawa that has access to the Red Sea, and the vital communications base of Asmara, as well as the strategic port of Aseb were all taken over by the Ethiopian emperor.[11] The United States of America was very much interested in the strategic bases that were held by Ethiopia since “the Red Sea coast gained strategic and commercial importance”[12] after the opening of the Suez Canal under Egypt’s control.[13] It was also important for the US to support Ethiopia in order to maintain the balance of power during the Cold War since Somalia; Ethiopia’s neighbor was supported by the Soviet Union. The level of American enthusiasm in Horn of Africa is quite clear when considering that 50% of the total American military aid of the sub-Saharan area went to Ethiopia during the early years of the Cold War.[14] Interestingly, while the Americans supported Haile Selassie, the Cubans and Chinese trained Isaias Afeworke and helped him ultimately lead the armed and rebellious group, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF).[15] In the meantime however, the US government only managed to support Ethiopia and keep Eritrea as a vital base for themselves till 1978 since Mengistu Haile Mariam, the atrocious communist leader supported by Moscow overthrew the Emperor.[16] From 1977 to 1990 the Soviet Union supplied Mengistu arms that were worth 12 billion dollars.[17] This concerning development worried America, for which reason the United States managed to invest in supplying arms to the various rebel groups including the Ethiopian People’s Liberation Front (EPRDF) as well as the Oromo People’s Democratic Front (OPDF).[18] Although these groups were fundamentally hard-lining left wing in terms of ideology[19], it seemed vital for the Americans to cut down the USSR led support of Mengistu.

In the 1980s the various rebel groups started to grow strong in various parts of Ethiopia, for which reason Mengistu manipulated the diversion of food aid that Ethiopia was receiving by ensuring that the areas where the rebels were most prominent at did not receive any food, hence creating starvation among the population.[20] This corrupt scandal of his was internationally exposed in 1984 where a lot of international attention was given to the Ethiopia.[21] Mengistu’s efforts however did not crush the rebels but in fact only affected the poor peasants.[22] In 1988 the Tigrayan EPRDF, which was headed by Meles Zenawi formed a coalition with Isaias Afeworke’s EPLF that is also Tigray, and various other rebel groups formed by other ethnic backgrounds.[23] The armed offence of these rebel groups against Mengistu’s Dergue regime was rather strong, and tensions were growing so the United States tried to play as a semi-official mediator between the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Ethiopian government under the Presidency of Jimmy Carter.[24] The mediation was not fruitful, though eventually under President George Bush Senior, the group of negotiators and mediators, which included Senator Rudy Boschwitz, Robert Frassure (National Security Council Officer), and Irwin Hicks (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa).[25] According to Amare Tekle “the United States continued to support Ethiopia on the matter of Eritrea”[26] despite the deteriorated relations with Ethiopia. Although Amare Tekle does not spell it out, it does seem that he implied to mean that it was more viable for America to have better control over the Eritrean strategic areas if it is under the federal authority of Ethiopia, for which reason the support America gave to the rebel groups directed them to Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. This meant that the team of American negotiators had to ensure a departure of Mengistu and an arrival of a new government that side the US.

The American strategy so far seemed to be working rather well because Mengistu was under severe pressure and the rebel groups were closing in on Addis Ababa. Although America’s major aim was to secure Eritrea as a major hub for their strategic maneuverings for their naval and marine forces, it was also important for them to rescue the mistreated Falasha’s (Ethiopian Jews) perceivably at the request of Israel. The US in exchange for the 18000 Jews to be fled to Israel paid Ethiopia 35 million dollars.[27] Since Mengistu was losing the war, he seemed to be cooperating with the Americans rather well according to Herman Cohen who also happened to be the American Secretary of State for Africa.[28] Based on the information Cohen provides, it also seems that America arranged for Mengistu to migrate to Zimbabwe[29] in order to perceivably reduce violence and be more efficient in making the transition of government smoother and quicker. In the meantime Mr. Cohen himself was conducting a conference in London with representatives of most of the Rebel groups present in order to discuss the future of Ethiopia and its power holdings.[30] The conference was however a failure since the EPRDF stormed into Addis Ababa and the EPLF in Asmara.[31] By then victory for the American interests in the Horn of Africa could be smelt by them when Cohen, at the request of Meles induced an American statement on the BBC Radio network in Addis Ababa declaring a new government[32] but also foolishly adding that Eritrean people will have the right to vote for an independent Eritrea[33]. The flaw with this was that the Tigray population was scattered all over Ethiopian and Eritrean territory, and to take decisive vote which would be fair was almost impossible logically speaking, especially considering the state at which Ethiopia and Eritrea’s infrastructure and logistics was. Nonetheless this statement caused rage among the Amhara population in Addis Ababa since they were against an independent Tigray state.[34] The rage, arguably speaking could also have been there since the EPRDF was primarily composed of Tigrays and the ruling population of Ethiopia would be Tigrays instead of Amharas.

The United States of America now needed to ensure that a hard-lining government like that of Mengistu was not formed, so they broke a deal with Meles Zenawi that Ethiopia will only receive aid from America if they take a democratic path.[35] In the meantime Isaias Afeworke stated that the “EPLF propaganda has been strong enough over the past decades”[36] and that the people’s sentiments were in favor of an independent Eritrea.[37] By this time the American government seemed to have been convinced based on their actions that if Eritrea peacefully seceded and retained the path of democracy, they could still pursue with their strategic interests in that region. While the formalities of independence were being completed, Ethiopia and Eritrea shared the same currency even though Eritrea were given a high degree of autonomy, and Ethiopia in the meantime were given permission to use the ports of Massawa and Aseb, and even the communications centre of Asmara.[38] The strong and direct diplomatic ties between America and Ethiopia seemed to have helped since both the countries were able to gain from an autonomous Eritrea that’s heading for independence.[39] By April 1993, the EPLF managed to prepare a Referendum on Independence under conditions approved by the United Nations with the UN observers present during the votes.[40] The results were overwhelmingly high in favor of Eritrean independence with 99.8% of the people in favor of an independent Eritrea.[41] Such unlikely high results are rather obvious signs of a rigged voting system, which even the UN observers, seemed to have noticed. Interestingly however, the United States did not utter a single word of dissent against this undemocratic move. Eritrea was then declared independent in May 1993 with the “blessings of Ethiopia”.[42] From then on the United States expected Isaias to lead a democratic Eritrea that played to the strategic interests of the United States. In the meantime the EPRDF with the financial and political assistance of the United States continued to help Isaias Afeworke consolidate power over Eritrea.

In conclusion, the major reason for America to help Eritrea gain independence was to serve its own strategic interests of occupying a port that had access to the Red Sea ever since the Egyptian Suez Canal was in function, which was only possible with a stable government controlling that area. It seemed that the American foreign policy did not distinguish as to who the Eritrean territory falls under as long as the government there is favorable to them. Logically speaking, the main reason why the America supported an Eritrean independence rather than an Ethiopian seizure was in order to reduce ethnic violence and chaos so that the American business and military practices in the region could resume as soon as possible. America managed to achieve its control over Eritrea over the years by initially supporting Haile Selassie, then the rebel groups for countering Moscow led Mengistu’s regime through military, diplomatic and political assistance. The ultimate point is that whether Eritrea was independent from Ethiopia or not, America, by hook or by crook retained their access to the Red Sea as a vital strategic base.

Bibliography

Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284.

Gottesman, Leslie. To Fight and Learn: the Praxis and Promise of Literacy in Eritrea's Independence War. Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1997. 2-280.

Pool, David. "Eritrean Independence: the Legacy of the Derg and the Politics of Reconstruction." African Affairs 92 (1993): 389-402. 29 Jan. 2008

Sorenson, John. "Discourses on Eritrean Nationalism and Identity." The Journal of Modern African Studies 29 (1991): 301-317. 28 Jan. 2008 .

Tekle, Amare. Eritrea and Ethiopia: From Conflict to Cooperation. Taunton: The Red Sea Press, 1994. 2-228.

---

[1] Gottesman, Leslie. To Fight and Learn: the Praxis and Promise of Literacy in Eritrea's Independence War. Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1997. 2-280. – Page 39.

[2] Gottesman, Leslie. To Fight and Learn: the Praxis and Promise of Literacy in Eritrea's Independence War. Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1997. 2-280. – Page 39

[3] Gottesman, Leslie. To Fight and Learn: the Praxis and Promise of Literacy in Eritrea's Independence War. Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1997. 2-280. – Page 41.

[4] Gottesman, Leslie. To Fight and Learn: the Praxis and Promise of Literacy in Eritrea's Independence War. Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1997. 2-280. – Page 41.

[5] Sorenson, John. "Discourses on Eritrean Nationalism and Identity." The Journal of Modern African Studies 29 (1991): 301-317. 28 Jan. 2008 . – Page 305.

[6] Gottesman, Leslie. To Fight and Learn: the Praxis and Promise of Literacy in Eritrea's Independence War. Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1997. 2-280. – Page 42.

[7] Gottesman, Leslie. To Fight and Learn: the Praxis and Promise of Literacy in Eritrea's Independence War. Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1997. 2-280. – Page 43.

[8] Sorenson, John. "Discourses on Eritrean Nationalism and Identity." The Journal of Modern African Studies 29 (1991): 301-317. 28 Jan. 2008 . – Page 306

[9] Sorenson, John. "Discourses on Eritrean Nationalism and Identity." The Journal of Modern African Studies 29 (1991): 301-317. 28 Jan. 2008 . – Page 303.

[10] Sorenson, John. "Discourses on Eritrean Nationalism and Identity." The Journal of Modern African Studies 29 (1991): 301-317. 28 Jan. 2008 . – Page 303.

[11] Pool, David. "Eritrean Independence: the Legacy of the Derg and the Politics of Reconstruction." African Affairs 92 (1993): 389-402. 29 Jan. 2008 . – Page 391.

[12] Gottesman, Leslie. To Fight and Learn: the Praxis and Promise of Literacy in Eritrea's Independence War. Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1997. 2-280. – Page 43.

[13] Gottesman, Leslie. To Fight and Learn: the Praxis and Promise of Literacy in Eritrea's Independence War. Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1997. 2-280. – Page 43.

[14] Pool, David. "Eritrean Independence: the Legacy of the Derg and the Politics of Reconstruction." African Affairs 92 (1993): 389-402. 29 Jan. 2008 . – Page 391.

[15] Pool, David. "Eritrean Independence: the Legacy of the Derg and the Politics of Reconstruction." African Affairs 92 (1993): 389-402. 29 Jan. 2008 . – Page 395.

[16] Pool, David. "Eritrean Independence: the Legacy of the Derg and the Politics of Reconstruction." African Affairs 92 (1993): 389-402. 29 Jan. 2008 . – Page 391.

[17] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284. – Page 68.

[18] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284. – Page 68.

[19] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284. – Page 72.

[20] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284. – Page 81

[21] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284. – Page 81.

[22] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284. – Page 83.

[23] Tekle, Amare. Eritrea and Ethiopia: From Conflict to Cooperation. Taunton: The Red Sea Press, 1994. 2-228. – Page 46.

[24] Pool, David. "Eritrean Independence: the Legacy of the Derg and the Politics of Reconstruction." African Affairs 92 (1993): 389-402. 29 Jan. 2008 .

[25] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284.

[26] Tekle, Amare. Eritrea and Ethiopia: From Conflict to Cooperation. Taunton: The Red Sea Press, 1994. 2-228. – Page 48.

[27] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284. – Page 88.

[28] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284. – Page 88.

[29] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284. – Page 89.

[30] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284. – Page 92.

[31] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284. – Page 93.

[32] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284. – Page 101.

[33] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284. – Page 101.

[34] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284.

[35] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284.

[36] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284.

[37] Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. Gordonsville: VHPS Distribution, 2000. 1-284. – Page 81.

[38] Pool, David. "Eritrean Independence: the Legacy of the Derg and the Politics of Reconstruction." African Affairs 92 (1993): 389-402. 29 Jan. 2008

[39] Pool, David. "Eritrean Independence: the Legacy of the Derg and the Politics of Reconstruction." African Affairs 92 (1993): 389-402. 29 Jan. 2008

[40] Pool, David. "Eritrean Independence: the Legacy of the Derg and the Politics of Reconstruction." African Affairs 92 (1993): 389-402. 29 Jan. 2008

[41] Pool, David. "Eritrean Independence: the Legacy of the Derg and the Politics of Reconstruction." African Affairs 92 (1993): 389-402. 29 Jan. 2008

[42] Pool, David. "Eritrean Independence: the Legacy of the Derg and the Politics of Reconstruction." African Affairs 92 (1993): 389-402. 29 Jan. 2008

To What Extent has the World Trade Organization Established a System of Effective Global Governance?

The formation of the General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1948 with various success and failures led to the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 following the Tokyo and Uruguay rounds.[1] Since then the WTO has managed to incorporate 151 members in the institution that are required to abide by the trade laws that the WTO sets. The following essay will analyze objectively and normatively in regards to the effectiveness of the WTO in systematic Global Governance, although my focal point of argument will lead to decide that although the WTO has won various successes in global governance, the failures have been equally distinct, for which reason the legitimacy of the WTO would be in question, hence undermining the WTO’s effectiveness of the established system of global governance.

In order to understand how the WTO manages its global governing, it is paramount to recall the general structure of the WTO. The most significant body within the framework of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference that is made up of member states that meets once in two years.[2] Though the General Council, which meets several times every year in Geneva is made up of representatives and counsels of particular member states.[3] The members of the General Council also facilitate in the functioning of other structural bodies such as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).[4] Although there are other layers that go down the pyramid in the structure of the WTO, this essay will mainly use the functions of the above listed structures as the core pivot in arguing the question. Theoretically speaking, it would be fair to state that the WTO can practice what it claims with the structure it currently has, this being “to assist human society achieve its common purpose in a sustainable manner, that is with equity and justice”.[5] However, when analyzing carefully as to how the WTO has been functioning since its creation, one would learn that the organization, significantly because of its structure, loses a credible amount of legitimacy, and also undermines other core values that would be in the interest of humanity, as the WTO itself emphasises the importance for pursuit of nations to the “right to health and education or core labour standards”[6] and further “to favour values of public morals, the protection of health of people, animals and health or the conservation of natural resources”.[7]

Currently there are 151 member states at the Ministerial Conference, and during their meet every two years, they discuss various important issues concerning trade issues, and try to prioritize the opening of the markets. Of course, it is understandable that the opening of markets is not favourable to all state economies, for which reason certain proposals are passed and others are not. A fair yet an interesting drawback of these meetings are that the agreements must be ratified only by consensus (not to confuse with unanimity).[8] As democratic and fair this may sound, the practicality does not always work out well because usually the matters that are to be discussed in the Ministerial Conferences are pre-decided by the General Council that is based in Geneva, and the major problem is that not all states, especially those financially deprived do not have representatives and counsels.[9] For which reason, whenever a negotiation fails due to controversial matters, the financially weak countries revert to solving the disagreement through the Dispute Settlement Body, where financial backing is helpful to hire lawyers and counsels for that particular case, and this situation, which is of course a more defensive posture for the less wealthy nation, and so the more powerful countries have an upper-hand in attaining the results they wish for negotiations or trade conflict resolution.[10] To make matters worse for the poorer countries, which make up the majority of the WTO, a minority number of states form the so-called “Green Room”, whereby this group of states attempt to finalize “preliminary agreements on matters under negotiation, and then present them to the rest of the delegations”.[11] During the Ministerial Conference in Seattle, various states were agitated because of this peculiar behaviour of the powerful states, and the negotiations broke down entirely on the last day of the rounds.[12] According to Peter Sutherland and John Sewell, the “Green Rooms... understandably grew” since most states would aspire to be in the ‘ruling’ economic circle of the world.[13] Of course, it is difficult to deny that the WTO did attempt to create a somewhat democratic state-to-state representation structurally, and also by constitutionalising a one state, one vote system unlike the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.[14] Leaving alone the internal structural problems, it is also important to note that 41 States are still not WTO members, and so the deals made by the WTO members may seem unfair to non-members. This essentially also makes the WTO an institution that is not entirely global yet. Therefore, the practical functionalities undermine the democracy and in a sense creates an elite circle of states among the institution, hence making quite a few decisions taken by the WTO illegitimate in the perspective of the states who are not ‘privileged’ in the institution, which is obviously a reason to question the effectiveness of the WTO’s global governance.

Despite these failures of the WTO, it is vital to acknowledge that the organization has managed to recruit most states of world, so it would be fair to the WTO, it is also important to analyze the successes it has in lifting the positions of various countries, and opening the markets of most countries as well. There has been a "remarkable emergence of developing nations as significant players in the global economy”[15] such as India and China. One possible reason for this, out of many would be that there has been an increase from 4 per cent to 24 per cent of increase in world exports of manufacturers cumulative of all developing nations.[16] To add to this, it is also useful to consider the dramatic hike in investment that took place in developing countries by “industrial country firms and portfolio investors, and increasingly by investors from emerging market countries”.[17] In fact the “stock of foreign direct investment” in relation to the GDP increased by three-fold for the developing countries at an average of 5.9 per cent to 16.6 per cent from 1980 to 1997.[18] Unfortunately however, this is only one side of the coin, because the poorer countries of the world have raw materials of about 75 per cent that could be exported but are not processed, and the export that they are able to do is as narrow as 70 per cent of national exports coming from only three major export sources.[19] The poor countries for this reason become vulnerable, and in fact become less competitive, and so could be bullied, to say the least, more easily by the more powerful countries that have their financial interests invested in the local markets of these countries. Logically speaking these types of countries should ideally protect their local businesses from strong western businesses that infiltrate in the market, though breaking WTO laws would have dire circumstances, hence the only choice left would be to open up their markets. According to many developing nations, the justice that the WTO provides is unfair.[20] This is because WTO members have to open up their markets, and if their economies are not opened enough, they are liable to face sanctions from other countries. One of the most significant differences between the GATT and the WTO is that the “WTO was vested with legal personality”[21], so that if at all a state takes any unilateral measures against another state, then either that particular state could be subject to sanctions, and if there is ambiguity as whether a state has violated any WTO law or not, then the matter will be taken to the Dispute Settlement Process.[22] Since many states do not have representatives and counsels in the General Council, having a viable chance to compete a powerful nation in disputes in Dispute Settlement Processes would be difficult. In this respect the WTO fails to provide fair justice to nations who are in an extreme need of it, hence the WTO is on the receiving end of criticism from the majority of the nations within its membership, disabling systematic governance to flow smoothly, and of course, once again lose a certain level of democratic legitimacy.

On a grander scale, there is also a concern of not only the states as a whole receiving democratic treatment, but also the individuals concerned in each WTO member states having their democratic rights distorted. At times the opening of markets may be against the interests of the majority of the population of a specific state, for which reason they may have elected a particular government representative, but since every WTO member state has to change her domestic laws in accordance to the WTO’s constitution[23], the democratic rights of the people who elected a particular leader in the first place would be undermined. In this respect it could be said that the “WTO’s authority even eclipses national governments”[24], which of course accentuates the cause of globalization, but at the same time diminishes the sovereignty of any given state, even if it is the most powerful country among the member state of the WTO. In addition to that the negotiations that happen during the Ministerial Council conferences are not open to public knowledge[25]; hence the media or public has no access to know how the negotiations took place and how the decisions were made[26]. In Seattle talks of 1999, more than 50,000 people demonstrated against the WTO’s agenda[27], of course that meeting arguably broke down for other reasons as stated earlier, but the point of the matter is that the following meeting took place in Doha, Qatar, where the freedom of expression is not imposed among the masses. Sceptics of the WTO argue that the elites and corporate that help govern the WTO do not want any public interference with state negotiations. At a grass-root democratic level, the WTO in this respect has no legitimacy whatsoever to even exist, and so for state-leaders to persuade the masses that the WTO enforces a fair and systematic form of global governance becomes a bit too difficult.

Further agitations are caused for the states and its peoples when events do not conform to what WTO leaders such as Lamy Pascal claim about certain goals of the WTO, such as “to favour values of public morals, the protection of health of people, animals and health or the conservation of natural resources”.[28] When WTO attorneys make rulings where the American law that protects sea turtles was considered, by the WTO, as a “barrier to free trade”[29], or for that matter ruling that the American clean air standards and laws that protected the dolphin in American waters were also considered illegal[30], the masses, and the government, rightly so would be infuriated. In this respect the WTO has prioritized financial wealth in the form of trade agreements to be more valuable than the environment, which not only undermines democracy but also values that are regarded highly by the WTO and its members by itself. Similar agitation had taken place when the European Union treated hormone-treated beef as illegal for health related reasons, but the WTO contradicted that ruling and forced the European Union to change its laws since the original EU laws were not affirming to the WTO standards of trade.[31] This level of agitation at a public level is existing within the states that withhold must power in the WTO, so it would be fair to assume that the level of infuriation would be much higher at a public level in the developing countries. States were at dismay in the 2003 talks of Cancun, Mexico, because “a remarkable new alliance of developing countries argued that the unfair global agricultural system had to be cleaned up first”[32] that the developed countries were trying to impose and expand new issues.[33] “The tragic suicide of Korean farmer Lee Kyung Hae”[34] was what sparked this consensus among various states; of course, these talks fell apart as well.[35] Since consensus rules within the Ministerial Council, it becomes quite difficult to manage so many different perspectives with varied values and priorities to come to an agreement. So not only does this cause to delegitimize the existence of the WTO among a mass population, but states within the WTO cannot get to agree with each other, hence undermining the governance of the organization.

To be fair to the WTO, they do have modes for certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to participate in Dispute Settlements through the General Council[36] when it comes to protecting the environment, health matters, and of course labour standards. Unfortunately however, there is not direct rights that NGO’s can have in regards to WTO issues[37], and interestingly it could be argued that commercial corporate companies have a better base than the NGO’s in terms of influence in the WTO. In fact, in many cases, information in relation to negotiation processes is not given to the NGO’s (and the public) but is in practice given to certain concerned corporate groups.[38] Hence the successes of NGO’s are less probable than that of bigger companies. A relevant example would be of Guatemala, where the government in cooperation with certain NGO groups tried to decrease infant mortality rates, of course the preferred and original medical guideline was to encourage mothers to breastfeed their children, however the WTO set standards and guidelines where they pushed products of certain milk companies and deemed it to be more superior medically, of course, the initial result was that the babies seemed more nourished, but eventually this led to more infant mortality because the powder the WTO pushed to be used had to be mixed with water.[39] The water in the affected regions was medically unsafe, so the babies eventually died of infant diarrhoea.[40] So in most cases it has been seen that the WTO has treated finance as more valuable than of any other kind of humane value, and so corporate companies in this sense overpower the people of the world, even if those people are meant to be living in a democratically driven state. Although it could be argued here that the WTO has managed to use its legal and political power, influence, and finance to change policies in various countries, the cost at which they do so is much higher than any financial value that could possibly be calculated. This in return means that the WTO get criticised by the increasing number of NGO’s, governments, and of course the people of individual states, hence making global governance difficult. As seen in various Ministerial Talks, which have failed, it also seems that there is a strong rift between powerful nations and developing nations, making it hard for the WTO to enforce multilateral trade negotiations, and finally, losing legitimacy among its members and the masses.

Finally, an issue including the structure of the WTO that is impractical for fair global governance resulting in unfair practices of justice leads states and peoples of the states to view the WTO negatively despite of some of the economic successes it has brought about. Due to the impractical structure, the negotiations at the Ministerial Level become weak, and the representation at the General Council becomes imbalanced in terms of opportunities given to each state to perform their rights, the powerful members of the WTO could influence the organization to financially and politically control the economies and social structures of the various parts of the world, but at the expense of legitimacy. Therefore these failures undermine the effectiveness of the global governance of the World Trade Organization, which according to a high volume of the masses in democratic institutions, should not be existing the way it is.

Bibliography

Lamy, Pascal. "Towards Global Governance?" www.wto.org. 21 Oct. 2005. World Trade Organization. 07 Mar. 2008 .

Ricupero, Rubens. "WTO, Global Governance and New Trade Round." 2001. www.twnside.org. 07 Mar. 2008 .

Sutherland, Peter, and John Sewell. "Challenges Facing the WTO and Policies to Address Global Governance." UNU (2000): 86-118. 03 Mar. 2008 .

Wallach, Lori. "Free Trade - the Price Paid." www.globalissues.org. 13 Apr. 2005. 3 Mar. 2008 .

Willets, Peter. "Civil Society Networks in Global Governance: Remedying the World Trade Organization's Deviance From Global Norms." www.city.ac.uk. 20 Sept. 2002. City University, London. 03 Mar. 2008 .

Winham, Gilbert R. Global Political Economy. Ed. John Ravenhill. 2nd ed. Vol. 1st. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. 88-113.

"World Trade Organization." www.globalexchange.org. 28 Oct. 2007. 02 Mar. 2008 .

---

[1] Winham, Gilbert R. Global Political Economy. Ed. John Ravenhill. 2nd ed. Vol. 1st. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. 88-113.

[2] Winham, Gilbert R. Global Political Economy. Ed. John Ravenhill. 2nd ed. Vol. 1st. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. 88-113.

[3] Winham, Gilbert R. Global Political Economy. Ed. John Ravenhill. 2nd ed. Vol. 1st. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. 88-113.

[4] Winham, Gilbert R. Global Political Economy. Ed. John Ravenhill. 2nd ed. Vol. 1st. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. 88-113.

[5] Lamy, Pascal. "Towards Global Governance?" www.wto.org. 21 Oct. 2005. World Trade Organization. 07 Mar. 2008 .

[6] Lamy, Pascal. "Towards Global Governance?" www.wto.org. 21 Oct. 2005. World Trade Organization. 07 Mar. 2008 .

[7] Lamy, Pascal. "Towards Global Governance?" www.wto.org. 21 Oct. 2005. World Trade Organization. 07 Mar. 2008 .

[8] Winham, Gilbert R. Global Political Economy. Ed. John Ravenhill. 2nd ed. Vol. 1st. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. 88-113.

[9] Sutherland, Peter, and John Sewell. "Challenges Facing the WTO and Policies to Address Global Governance." UNU (2000): 86-118. 03 Mar. 2008 .

[10] Ricupero, Rubens. "WTO, Global Governance and New Trade Round." 2001. www.twnside.org. 07 Mar. 2008 .

[11] Sutherland, Peter, and John Sewell. "Challenges Facing the WTO and Policies to Address Global Governance." UNU (2000): 86-118. 03 Mar. 2008 .

[12] Sutherland, Peter, and John Sewell. "Challenges Facing the WTO and Policies to Address Global Governance." UNU (2000): 86-118. 03 Mar. 2008 .

[13] Sutherland, Peter, and John Sewell. "Challenges Facing the WTO and Policies to Address Global Governance." UNU (2000): 86-118. 03 Mar. 2008 .

[14] Ricupero, Rubens. "WTO, Global Governance and New Trade Round." 2001. www.twnside.org. 07 Mar. 2008 .

[15] Sutherland, Peter, and John Sewell. "Challenges Facing the WTO and Policies to Address Global Governance." UNU (2000): 86-118. 03 Mar. 2008 .

[16] Sutherland, Peter, and John Sewell. "Challenges Facing the WTO and Policies to Address Global Governance." UNU (2000): 86-118. 03 Mar. 2008 .

[17] Sutherland, Peter, and John Sewell. "Challenges Facing the WTO and Policies to Address Global Governance." UNU (2000): 86-118. 03 Mar. 2008 .

[18] Sutherland, Peter, and John Sewell. "Challenges Facing the WTO and Policies to Address Global Governance." UNU (2000): 86-118. 03 Mar. 2008 .

[19] Sutherland, Peter, and John Sewell. "Challenges Facing the WTO and Policies to Address Global Governance." UNU (2000): 86-118. 03 Mar. 2008 .

[20] Sutherland, Peter, and John Sewell. "Challenges Facing the WTO and Policies to Address Global Governance." UNU (2000): 86-118. 03 Mar. 2008 .

[21] Winham, Gilbert R. Global Political Economy. Ed. John Ravenhill. 2nd ed. Vol. 1st. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. 88-113.

[22] Winham, Gilbert R. Global Political Economy. Ed. John Ravenhill. 2nd ed. Vol. 1st. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. 88-113.

[23] Sutherland, Peter, and John Sewell. "Challenges Facing the WTO and Policies to Address Global Governance." UNU (2000): 86-118. 03 Mar. 2008 .

[24] "World Trade Organization." www.globalexchange.org. 28 Oct. 2007. 02 Mar. 2008 .

[25] "World Trade Organization." www.globalexchange.org. 28 Oct. 2007. 02 Mar. 2008 .

[26] "World Trade Organization." www.globalexchange.org. 28 Oct. 2007. 02 Mar. 2008 .

[27] "World Trade Organization." www.globalexchange.org. 28 Oct. 2007. 02 Mar. 2008 .

[28] Lamy, Pascal. "Towards Global Governance?" www.wto.org. 21 Oct. 2005. World Trade Organization. 07 Mar. 2008 .

[29] "World Trade Organization." www.globalexchange.org. 28 Oct. 2007. 02 Mar. 2008 .

[30] "World Trade Organization." www.globalexchange.org. 28 Oct. 2007. 02 Mar. 2008 .

[31] "World Trade Organization." www.globalexchange.org. 28 Oct. 2007. 02 Mar. 2008 .

[32] "World Trade Organization." www.globalexchange.org. 28 Oct. 2007. 02 Mar. 2008 .

[33] "World Trade Organization." www.globalexchange.org. 28 Oct. 2007. 02 Mar. 2008 .

[34] "World Trade Organization." www.globalexchange.org. 28 Oct. 2007. 02 Mar. 2008 .

[35] "World Trade Organization." www.globalexchange.org. 28 Oct. 2007. 02 Mar. 2008 .

[36] Willets, Peter. "Civil Society Networks in Global Governance: Remedying the World Trade Organization's Deviance From Global Norms." www.city.ac.uk. 20 Sept. 2002. City University, London. 03 Mar. 2008 .

[37] Willets, Peter. "Civil Society Networks in Global Governance: Remedying the World Trade Organization's Deviance From Global Norms." www.city.ac.uk. 20 Sept. 2002. City University, London. 03 Mar. 2008 .

[38] Wallach, Lori. "Free Trade - the Price Paid." www.globalissues.org. 13 Apr. 2005. 3 Mar. 2008 .

[39] Wallach, Lori. "Free Trade - the Price Paid." www.globalissues.org. 13 Apr. 2005. 3 Mar. 2008 .

[40] Wallach, Lori. "Free Trade - the Price Paid." www.globalissues.org. 13 Apr. 2005. 3 Mar. 2008 .